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Abstract. This paper deals with a top down design of an example multiplexer cell that 
exhibits high immunity to Side Channel Attack (SCA). Four different solutions of the 
encrypted multiplexer cell are revised, and the best design adopted. The post-layout 
simulations prove resistance of the multiplexer logic cell to the SCA. Since the physical 
layout structure and the functionality of this kind of design is based on symmetry, 
concerns were expressed as to what will be the effectiveness of the method under real 
production conditions. To get a proper answer to that, the adequacy of the chosen 
design for the multiplexer cell, which uses the "No Short-circuit Current Dynamic 
Differential Logic" (NSDDL) method, is confirmed by observing a Normalized 
Standard Deviation (NSD). 
Key words: CMOS integrated circuits, encrypted cell, layout, electrical and post-layout 
simulation, SCA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
By following the trends in the IC technology one can conclude that cryptography 
takes the leading research challenge because of the high importance of data security. 
Starting from the credit cards, coded alarm systems to all types of cipher-protected data 
transfer, it is necessary to protect the code keys from the misuse [1-2]. Even the protected 
systems can be attacked. Any unauthorized collecting of information about cryptosystem 
behavior is referred to as Side Channel Attack (SCA) [3-5]. The dominant mechanism for 
SCA is based on observing the dynamics consumption of electronic encrypted system. 
The key source of information about the behavior of a circuit is the circuit's activity. This 
information is usually impressed in the power supply current, IDD. Therefore, one of the 
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most powerful methods for analyzing this current is the Differential Power Analysis 
(DPA) which belongs to the group of SCA attacks [6-7]. Observing changes in the 
supply current and correlating them with a known input vector can be used as valuable 
information for breaking the coding key. The physical background for this approach 
comes from the fact that significant current drawn from the power supply, IDD, in a 
CMOS digital circuit flows only during the transition of a logic state. Moreover, IDD 
changes produce electromagnetic field variations which the attackers may catch using 
special probes. Therefore, the circuits' immunity to SCA - i.e. SCA resistance, is 
determined by the ability to mask the correlation between IDD and stimulated, input, code 
sequence. 
The focus of this research is the implementation of countermeasures, at the transistor 
level design. In particular, the protection against SCA should be built-in in every custom 
design of digital cell. The cryptographic method chosen for the design of these cells is 
known as the No Short-circuit current Dynamic Differential Logic (NSDDL) method [8]. 
Our goal here is to characterize a two-to-one multiplexer (MUX2x1) cell designed with a 
good SCA resistance using as little hardware as possible. This cell is a part of a standard 
cell library that is developed as a base for the synthesis of cryptographic systems. We 
consider it as a suitable representative since it is complex enough to expose the main 
weaknesses of the NSDDL method. 
This paper is organized as follows: the second section presents the basics of the 
NSDDL method, while the third section describes the design of an encrypted multiplexer 
cell. The fourth section considers results obtained with the post-layout simulation. It 
includes comparisons, as well. The final section summarizes the overall contribution of 
this research. 
2. CONCEPT OF THE SCA PROTECTION AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE NSDDL METHOD 
Each rising edge of a digital signal requires additional charge to be added from the 
power supply line to the output capacitance. On the other hand, the load discharges 
during the falling edge. The amount of the charge increment is proportional to the 
number of capacitors being charged as well as - the circuit activity. 
The attacker is usually armed with probes that sense the IDD change. He tracks the IDD 
for the known input signals (tried password). Accordingly, anyone who has elementary 
knowledge of digital electronic circuits may conclude about the transitions occurring 
inside an IC. Therefore, digital signal tracking supported by monitoring of the IDD 
becomes a powerful tool for eavesdropping the activities within a digital circuit. 
Hence, the concept of protection against SCA is based on hiding the correlation 
between changes of the logic states and the waveform of power consumption. According 
to the level where the protection is applied, protection concepts can be classified as: 
architectural, gate and transistor levels [9]. The focus of this research is the third class of 
protection. 
The last-mentioned way represents the class of methods known as Dual-rail with Pre-
charge Logic (DPL) method [10]. With this methodology all the signals in the circuit are 
duplicated by introducing their complements in order to have their true and false 
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representatives. Therefore, each combination of input signals applied to the inputs of 
SCA resistant cells manifests with the same power consumption. This is possible when 
every logic cell has the counterpart that will act complementary. For that reason, every 
cell needs to have two outputs, denoted as true and false. Consequently, the cell will have 
transitions in both directions simultaneously at two output ports. The obtained hardware 
is doubled but the increased complexity enables the cell to hide its true function. 
Moreover, in order to mask neutral logic changes, every change at inputs must provoke 
changes at outputs.  
According to this methodology all logic in the circuit operates in Precharge and 
Evaluation phases to ensure exactly one switching event per cycle.  
One of the DPL representatives is the Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) 
method [11-12]. The drawback of this method is the requirement for balanced loads at 
true and false outputs. Therefore, very careful matching is required at the layout level to 
diminish this problem. An alternative method, known as the Current Mode Logic (CML) 
[13], is also sensitive to mismatching. Accordingly, other techniques have been proposed 
in the literature to avoid this obstacle.  
The following section describes the one known as the No Short-circuit current 
Dynamic Differential Logic (NSDDL). The most important property of this method is the 
duplication of the hardware, as in the case of the DPL method. The most important aspect 
of the NSDDL method is that it operates in three phases synchronized with the clock 
signal, as in the TDPL methodology (Three-Phase Dual-Rail Pre-Charge Logic) [5, 14]. 
The task of the Precharge phase is providing the high logic level at all (true and false) 
outputs. The Evaluation phase is the second phase, where the true outputs take real 
values while the false outputs take the complementary levels. The next phase is called the 
Discharge phase where all outputs reach a low logic level. For the implementation of all 
three phases the Dynamic nor (Dnor) circuit is used. Fig. 1 presents the schematic of one 
Dnor circuit. It is used both in the control logic and in all encrypted NSDDL logic cells. 
Table 1 describes the logic function of the Dnor cell. 
 
Fig. 1 Schematic of Dnor cell 
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Table 1 Logic function of Dnor cell 
 Signals 
Phases Pre Dis In Out 
Precharge 0 0 0/1 1 
Evaluation 1 0 0/1 1/0 
Discharge 1 1 0/1 0 
3. EVOLUTION OF THE DESIGN FOR THE ENCRYPTED MULTIPLEXER CELL 
The goal is to create an encrypted cell that gives high degree of protection against the 
SCA. The search for the best design required a development of several different 
architectures. The essential requirement is that the logic function of the circuit remains 
the same as for the unprotected cell. Fig. 2.a presents a symbol of a standard MUX2x1 
cell. The value of the SEL signal determines which of the input signals (A or B) will be 
forwarded to the output. The Fig. 2.b shows the schematic of this multiplexer as is in the 
TSMC035u library [15].  
a) b)  
 Fig. 2 Multiplexer MUX2x1 cell a) generic representation b) standard CMOS realization 
In the NSDDL methodology all input and output signals are controlled using the 
Dnor cells. Since the Dnor cell has an inverting function, all designs use a multiplexer 
cell with the inverted function. Those two structures are the base for the design of the 
encrypted MUX2x1 cell in accordance with the NSDDL method. Figs. 3a and 3b present 
the symbol and schematic of a standard MUX2x1 cell with inverted function, 
respectively. The schematic is taken from the same library. One can see that only the 
output inverter is removed when comparing with the MUX cell in Fig. 2.b.  
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a) b)  
Fig. 3 Multiplexer MUX2x1 cell with an inverted function a) generic representation  
b) standard CMOS realization 
The realization of all four NSDDL architectures will be described within this section. 
The complete cells design was accomplished using the Mentor Graphics design platform 
in a TSMC035 technology. All layouts of true and false sub-blocks are drawn 
symmetrically following the proper rules. In this way unequal power consumption in the 
complementary parts of the cell was suppressed [16]. 
3.1. Architecture I 
In the first architecture, true and false input signals are introduced as in Fig. 4 as 
notA, notB, and B, A respectively.  
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Fig. 4 Conceptual diagram of the MUX2x1 cell - Architecture I 
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Also, the sub-blocks are denoted as true and false and their outputs as OT and OF. These 
sub-blocks have the same structure but OT depends on notA and notB signals, while OF is a 
function of B and A. The signals SELT and SELF are directly connected to the multiplexers 
as SELT=SEL, SELF=NOT (SEL). Fig. 5 gives the layout of the Architecture I. 
 
Fig. 5 Layout of Architecture I 
3.2. Architecture II 
In the second architecture (Architecture II) only one SEL signal controlled by a Dnor 
cell is used. This means that both sub-blocks use the same SEL signal. The arrangement 
of input signals is different in comparison to the first architecture. This can be seen from 
the block diagram of the Architecture II in Fig. 6. The layout is given in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 6 Conceptual diagram of the MUX2x1 cell - Architecture II  
 
Fig. 7 Layout of Architecture II 
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As already mentioned, the true and false blocks are controlled with a single SEL signal 
that does not have its complementary pair. The aim of this modification is to investigate 
the additional reduction in the number of internal signals without losing the circuit’s 
main purpose and protection ability. With this layout the complementary SEL signal was 
avoided, cell area was minimally increased, while the functionality of the circuit retained. 
3.3. Architecture III 
The third architecture (Architecture III) considers SEL signals as any other inputs 
(which are included through Dnor). The SEL blocks must be reversed in comparison to 
the Architecture I, because the Dnor cell works as an inverter. Block diagram and layout 
of the third NSDDL MUX2x1 architecture (Architecture III) is presented in Figs. 8 and 
9, respectively. 
NSDDLMux2x1- Arhitecture III
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Fig. 8 Conceptual diagram of the MUX2x1 cell - Architecture III 
 
Fig. 9 Layout of Architecture III 
3.4. Architecture IV 
The fourth Architecture (Architecture IV) is based on a modification of the standard 
cell. Namely, the standard MUX2x1 cell can be customized to fit the NSDDL with 
reduced complexity. Figs. 10a and 10b give the symbol (generic representation) and 
schematic of modified MUX2x1 cell with the inverted function, respectively. When 
comparing Figs. 3b and 10b it can be noticed that one inverter is omitted.  
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a)  b)  
Fig. 10 Modified MUX2x1 with inverted function a) generic representation b) modified 
CMOS realization 
Actually, the Dnor circuit, used for the SEL signal, provides the omitted inverting 
function. In addition, it is necessary to connect the input signals as depicted on the block 
diagram in Fig. 11. 
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Fig. 11 Conceptual diagram of the MUX2x1 cell - Architecture IV 
Since, the SEL signals for true and false blocks are complementary the proposed 
arrangement of input signals is possible. The introduced innovation simplifies the hardware. 
The reduction of the number of transistors in multiplexer cell prevents buffering of the SEL 
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signal and the total propagation time of the cell, as well. In this way the SCA resistivity is 
increased, as will be elaborated in the next section. The Layout of Architecture IV is given 
in Fig. 12. 
 
Fig. 12 Layout of Architecture IV 
Table 2 gives comparative results of the layout areas for the unprotected standard 
MUX cell and for other four analysed architectures of the encrypted cell. The third row 
gives the normalized area for all cells. All cells are normalized with the area of the 
unprotected standard cell. 
Table 2 Comparative results of layout areas 
 Standard 
cell 
Architecture 
I II III IV 
Area [µm2] 288 861.12 1119.72 1232.8 1115 
Normalized area 1 2.99 3.88 4.28 3.87 
 
4. RESULTS 
The adopted criteria for the evaluation of designs’ specifications are: area of the 
layout, energy consumption and the SCA resistivity. The unprotected standard cell 
presents the reference case for the assessment of the protection degree for the encrypted 
cells. The normalized standard deviation (NSD) is adopted as a quantitative measure of 
the SCA resistivity for the encrypted cells designed at the transistor level [13-14, 17-18].  
The electrical and post-layout simulations were performed using Mentor Graphics® 
ELDO Spice. Obtained results were processed through the MATLAB® script. 
The estimation of the energy consumption is based on the computation of the integral 
of the power consumed over time (energy) according to (1) [5, 19]. 
  
0
 
T
DD DDE V i t dt  (1) 
One cycle (T) is defined as a time needed for the execution of three operational phases: 
Precharge, Evaluation and Discharge. The energy consumption is observed during this 
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cycle when the input signals of standard MUX2x1 change. Each input signal combination 
results with one power profile (waveform). Based on the obtained power profile, the energy 
- Ei, is calculated. Here, index i =1, 2,..., N is the i-th input combination, while N represents 
the number of input combinations. Therefore, Ei represents one element in the statistical 
assembly.  
Fig. 13 shows trends of the energy consumption for the unprotected standard cell and 
all four presented architectures. The input signal combinations are given in horizontal 
axis labels, A and B, where the symbols “↑” and “↓” denote the rise and fall transition, 
respectively. The ordinate label shows energy levels for the standard MUX2x1 cell and 
for all other architectures.  
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Fig. 13 Energy consumption during ten cycles of input signals change for the unprotected 
standard cell and for all four presented architectures. 
The Maximal and minimal values for the energy and the standard deviation are 
denoted with Emax, Emin and σ respectively. NSD is expressed as a perceptual ratio of 
the standard deviation and the mean energy value, according to (2). Table 3 gives these 
values for the unprotected standard cell and for all four presented architectures. 
  100 %


avg
NSD
E
 (2) 
For the standard logic cell, the NSD reaches 71%. It practically indicates the strong 
correlation between energy and input signal transitions. However, the NSDDL cell has 
the NSD value of nearly 5% for Architecture I, 1.69% for Architecture II, 1.2% for 
Architecture III and excellent 0.27% for Architecture IV. It should be emphasized that 
the published results for one-bit full adder; designed using the TPDyCML method [13] in 
terms of NSD achieved 0.35%. Obviously, Architecture IV exhibits very good resistance 
to SCA. 
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Table 3 Evaluation of results for the unprotected standard cell and for all four presented 
architectures 
 Standard  
cell 
Architecture 
I II III IV 
Emax[J] 7.66E-13 4.05E-12 5.64E-12 5.18E-12 4.74E-12 
Emin[J] -3.66E-16 3.56E-12 5.37 E-12 5.01E-12 4.71E-12 
Eavg[J] 3.33E-13 3.84E-12 5.46E-12 5.11E-12 4.73E-12 
σ [J] 2.37E-13 2.03E-13 9.23E-14 6.13E-14 1.26E-14 
NSD[%] 71.00 5.29 1.69 1.2 0.27 
Further, in comparison with the results achieved for the combinational logic cells, 
given in [20 - 21], where the NSD values are close to 1%, the Architecture IV represents 
a significantly improved solution in hardware SCA protection. 
 5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented improvement in designing the architectures of the 
encrypted multiplexer cell. Four different architectures have been compared with the 
unprotected Mux2x1 cell, and also with each other.  
The advantages of the first architecture are: simplicity and the smallest area. The second 
architecture increased circuit complexity by introducing one Dnor cell for the controlling 
signal. This improved the SCA resistance by a factor of 3.13, while decreasing NSD to 
1.69%.   
In the third architecture two Dnor cells are introduced for controlling of SEL signals, 
which contributed to better symmetry of the circuit. In this way the NSD is reduced to 
1.2. The improvement in SCA immunity is about 1.4 times with regard to the previous 
(Architecture II) NSD value. 
In the fourth architecture the modification within the standard MUX2x1 cell has been 
applied (that is a part of NSDDL MUX2x1). It has diminished the complexity for exactly 
one inverter. This innovation has decreased the previous design in size and gave 4.4 
times better SCA immunity, as well. The NSD here was only 0.27%. Finally, in 
comparison to the unprotected multiplexer cell the total improvement is about 263 times.  
The Architecture III offers better SCA resistance with the area similar to the 
Architecture II (1.1 times larger area). Architectures II and IV have occupied almost the 
same areas but the NSD of Architecture IV is about 6.26 times smaller. 
The benefit is not only in the increased resistance to SCA but also in the total power 
consumption. Depending on the required security level and areas, one can use less 
expensive solutions, as Architecture I, II or III have demonstrated. 
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